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Housing consumption is not only determined by a household’s income, but is also 
affected by its life-cycle and other households’ demographic factors. In an efficient 
housing market, households adjust their housing consumption according to the different 
needs across the life-cycle. Government’s housing policies can have distortional effects 
on households’ life-cycle housing choices. Few extant housing policy studies examined 
the distortional effects on the life-cycle choice behavior. This study explores the life-
cycle housing consumption choice of Singapore households. In particular, we will focus 
on the public housing policy effects on life-cycle housing choice. 
 
Singapore public housing market is characterized by the existence of two sub-markets, 
the new-flat market and the resale market. The resale market was liberalized in late 1989, 
since then the HDB owners can resale freely at the resale market subject to a minimum 
occupancy regulation. The minimum occupied period is five years for the new-flat 
owners, but only two and half years for the resale owners. Under this regulation, housing 
adjustment cost would be higher for new buyers than for resale buyers. The higher 
housing adjustment cost would motivate the new-flat buyers to choose flat size according 
to their longer-term housing needs in anticipation of longer occupancy period. In addition 
to the minimum occupancy regulation, there is an income ceiling to restrict higher 
income households to buy new flats. The desire to receive housing subsidies would 
encourage young professionals to purchase large new flats sooner before they reach their 
income potential to avoid the income ceiling constraint. These regulations distort the 
households’ housing consumption choices. Our empirical analysis aims to measure the 
difference in life-cycle housing choices between new-flat buyers and resale buyers. 
  
Our data source is Household Expenditure Survey (HES) conducted by Department of 
Statistics during 1997 and 1998. For the purpose of this study, our sample includes those 




We estimate the housing choice model using two housing consumption measurements, 
one continuous measurement based on Net Assessed Value (NAV) and one discrete 
measurement based on flat types. With the continuous measurement, we estimate the 
model using linear regression. With the discrete measurement, we estimate the model 
using ordered-choice method. The empirical results, however, are quite similar. 
 
Our empirical analysis shows an inverted U-shape life-cycle housing consumption pattern. 
This is consistent with the hypothesis of life-cycle consumption profile that housing 
demand would increase with the age of household head till certain life stage and then 
decrease as the household size changes over the household life cycle. We also observe a 
difference in life-cycle housing choices between new-flat buyers and resale buyers. The 
housing consumption for new-flat buyers appears to shift forward in anticipation of 
longer-term housing needs and possible income ceiling restriction. The difference is 
larger for households with higher permanent income, who would have greater demand for 
housing adjustment over the life cycle and would more likely face potential income 
ceiling restriction. 
 
Our estimates of the shift in life cycle housing choice between new-flat buyers and resale 
buyers, although consistent with our prediction, are statistically not very significant. Two 
limitations of our data contribute to the low accuracy of the estimates. First, the sample 
size is relatively small because we only focus on the households who purchased flats 
during 1990 to 1998. Second, we do not observe directly whether a flat was bought in 
new or resale market. We use the purchase price relative to the prevalent resale market 
price as an indicator to differentiate the new flat and the resale flat.    
 
Our empirical findings suggest that government regulations on housing market can distort 
households’ life-cycle housing consumption choice. With the higher adjustment cost due 
to the longer minimum occupied period, households would compromise their housing 
choice between short-term needs and long-term needs, which results in a welfare loss. 
The welfare loss would be more significant for households with higher permanent income, 
whose life-cycle housing choice pattern differ more pronouncedly between the new-flat 
market and resale market.  
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1.1 Research Motivation 
 
Housing is one of the important goods that Singapore households consume. Since 
housing is a complex and expensive good that usually require the down payment as well 
as mortgage financing, households may adjust their housing consumption in the different 
life stages of household members. Basic life-cycle model suggests an inverted U-shape of 
household income and consumption pattern over individual life cycle that is also 
supported in Browning and Crossley (2001). Needs adjusted consumption should be 
maintained [Crossley and Ostrovsky(2003)]. Thus life cycle models make predictions 
about the life-cycle pattern of housing consumption. For example, some retirees, when 
their children move out, may cash in by changing to smaller houses. 
 
In an efficient housing market, households adjust their housing consumption according to 
the different needs across the life cycle. Government’s housing policies can have 
distortional effects on households’ life-cycle housing choices. To our knowledge, few 
extant housing studies examine the distortional effects of housing policies on the life-
cycle choice behavior. This study aims to examine the life-cycle pattern of housing 
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consumption choice of Singapore households. In particular, we will focus on the public 
housing policy effects on the life-cycle housing choice.    
 
Singapore public housing system has developed well through a series of government’s 
housing policies as well as CPF1 schemes. The public housing market in Singapore is 
characterized as two sub-markets, the new HDB2 flat market and the resale market. The 
resale market was liberalized in late 1989, since then Singapore permanent residents and 
those households whose income exceed the income ceiling for the entry of new HDB 
flats can buy public flats from the resale market [Bardhan et al.(2003)]. The HDB resale 
application increased steadily during 1990~1998 and the resale price rose dramatically in 
the early half of 1990s, then followed by a market downturn in 1997 and 1998 (see 
Figure 1.1).  
 
In the resale market, the HDB home owners can sell their flats (either new or resale flats) 
subject to the minimum occupancy regulation. The minimum occupied period is five 
years for the new-flat owners, but only two and half years for the resale owners. With the 
rapid escalation in resale prices in early 1990s, the price differential between new flats 
and resale flats became large. More and more households choose to buy new HDB homes 
directly from government and the queue for the new flats was long. Under this situation, 
the CPF cash grant scheme was launched in 1994. The eligible first-time home buyers 
                                                 
1 Central Provident Fund (CPF) is a comprehensive pension fund contributed monthly by both employers 
and employees. It takes care of its members’ needs for retirement, homeownership and healthcare. CPF 
board was established in 1955 to administer the CPF operation system and preserve the values of savings. 
2 Housing Development Board (HDB) was set up in 1960 to provide affordable public homes, as well as 
mortgage loan financing at interest rate that are lower than commercial  banks. 
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can get a lump sum cash grant (S$30000~S$50000) from the government if they choose 
to buy in the resale market. The minimum occupied period is five years3. 
 














































































resale applications price index
 
 
Considering the minimum occupancy rule and the queuing time for HDB new flats, 
housing adjustment cost would be generally higher for new buyers than for resale buyers. 
The higher housing adjustment cost would motivate the new-flat buyers to choose flat 
size according to their longer-term housing needs in anticipation of longer occupancy 
period. A welfare loss may occur when households compromise their housing choice 
under the high adjustment cost.  
 
                                                 
3 To our knowledge, the home purchase under this scheme was popular in 1996 & 1997 when the queue for 
the new flats was very long. In fact, the lock-in time for new-flat buyers would include both the minimum 
occupancy period (5 years) and the queuing time (from registration for purchase to the possession of the 
flat), which is longer than the lock-in time for resale even with the grant.  
4 The resale HDB application data is only available since 1991. 
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In addition to the minimum occupancy regulation, there is an income ceiling to restrict 
higher income households to buy new flats. The desire to receive housing subsidies 
would encourage young professionals to purchase large new flats sooner before they 
reach their income potential to avoid the income ceiling constraint. These regulations 
distort the households’ housing consumption choices. For example, some young 
professional couples would have incentive to buy larger units than their housing needs at 
the time of home purchase in order to lock in the benefits of housing subsidy for the new 
flats.  
 
Housing demand and housing choice behavior based on individual data have been 
extensively researched in many countries, while similar studies have not received serious 
attention in Singapore. With micro household data from Household Expenditure Survey5 
(HES) as well as other relevant market data, our empirical analysis aims to examine the 
life-cycle pattern of housing consumption of Singapore households. Government 
regulations in the new flat market can have distortional effect on the life-cycle housing 
choice. Thus our empirical analysis also measures the difference in life-cycle housing 
choices between new-flat buyers and resale buyers. 
 
 
1.2 Thesis Organization 
 
                                                 
5 Housing Expenditure Survey (HES) is conducted y Department of Statistics of Singapore once in every 
five years to collect detailed information on the latest consumption expenditure of private households. 
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The next chapter introduces more details about Singapore housing system and the CPF 
schemes. Chapter 3 reviews the international and local literature on housing studies. 
Chapter 4 describes the data and the sample definition. The hypothesis of empirical 
models and the empirical model specifications are elaborated in Chapter 5 & 6. 
Regression results using OLS and ordered-choice model are presented in Chapter 7. 






SINGAPORE HOUSING SYSTEM  





2.1 Singapore Housing System 
 
The structure of Singapore housing system is diagramed in Appendix 1. The Singapore 
housing system is separated into public housing sector and private housing sector. In year 
2000, 88.8% of households dwell in public flats (Table 2.1 provides the structure of 
household dwellings in year 2000). HDB housing units dominate the housing sector. 88% 
of households dwell in HDB housing in which 93.2% are owner occupied. The 
households from low income to upper middle income who meet certain criteria can buy 
HDB housing units (see Appendix 2). The HDB executive condominium sector differs 
from other HDB flat sectors since it is a link of public housing to private housing. The 
executive condominium scheme was introduced in 1995 and it provides properties with 
comparable designs and facilities to private condominiums. It aims to meet the housing 
needs of the upper-middle-income families whose income level is close to but greater 
than the limits for purchasing the HDB flats. Public rental housing is either rented by 
government to the lowest income families or catered to ‘transitional’ families waiting for 
their home ownership flat as well as foreign workers in Singapore [Phang (2001)]. 
Private housing sector provides high quality of dwellings to the upper income families. 
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The private housing is mainly categorized into the non-landed property sector which 
includes private apartments and condominiums and landed property sector. Owner 
occupied private housing dominate the both sectors. The private rental sector mainly 
caters to the expatriate population in Singapore. 
 
 
Table 2.1: The Structure of Household Dwellings in year 2000 
               ( % ) 
                               Tenure type 
Dwelling type Own Rent Others Total 
HDB dwellings 93.2 6.0 0.8 88.0
Other public flats 88.6 9.2 2.2 0.8
Condominium and private flats 82.8 14.1 3.1 6.0
Landed properties 90.3 6.3 3.4 5.1
Others 45.5 44.4 10.1 0.1
Total 92.3 6.6 1.1 100
Households 852,483 61,061 9,780 923,325
 
Source: Census of Population in year 20006. Calculated by author. 
 
 
With the rapid economic growth, households’ demand for housing consumption has 
increased steadily 7 . Since establishment in 1960, the HDB has continually and 
progressively built larger and better public housing (from 1- or 2-room flats to 3-, 4-, 5- 
room and executive flats) to provide spacious living environment for the most of 
                                                 
6 Official census data refers to Singapore Residents Population only (i.e. Singaporeans and Permanent 
Residents) and the non-residents were excluded. The data on rental sector may underestimate the real 
market occupancy rate of the rental housing in the whole housing market in which foreign tenants are 
included.  
7 From Report on the Household Expenditure Survey 1997/1998, distribution of expenditure on housing is 
15.6%, 16.5%, 17.5%, 21.9% and 21.6% for 1978, 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998 respectively.  
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residents. Of the households dwelling in HDB housing, 94% live in 3-room flats and 
above, while 65% and 27% live in 4-room flats and 5-room flats and above, respectively8. 
All types of HDB flats are constructed similarly in high rise and high density 
development with 99-year land leases. In the private housing sector, 54% households live 
in condominiums and private flats, while 45% households live in landed private 
properties9. Private properties are identified in various types of dwelling product groups 
with different land leases from 99 year or 999 year-leasehold to freehold [Neo et. al 
(2003)].    
 
In terms of different housing types, we observe the structure of a housing ladder from the 
small HDB flats to the higher end private landed properties (see the Appendix 1).  With 
the fact that the majority of households have benefited from accessing the ownership of 
affordable public housing and more than 90% of households own at least one piece of 
residential property [Phang (2001)], the Singapore housing system is recognized as a 
successful case in the Asian region .  
 
 
2.2 The CPF Schemes 
 
As a Singapore social security system, the Central Provident Fund (CPF) provides 
retirement fund, healthcare needs, home ownership, family protection, asset enhancement, 
education fund, etc. The monthly compulsory savings contributed by both employees and 
                                                 
8, 8 Source: Census of Population in year 2000. Calculated by author. The executive condominiums are not 
counted separately, probably because of the latest development and a small share in the market. 
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employers at certain percentage of employees’ gross salary go into the three CPF 
accounts of each member, ordinary account, special account and medisave account10 in 
the proportion determined by the CPF board.  
 
From the beginning of the CPF in 1955, more and more CPF schemes have evolved that 
the CPF has developed from a simple saving plan to the current comprehensive saving 
and investment schemes. The theoretical implication of the CPF that people accumulate 
wealth during working life and dis-save in later life (Basic Life-cycle Model Hypothesis) 
make itself go beyond its original objective to be a social security for the retirees [Low 
and Aw (1997), Crossley and Ostrovsky (2003)].  
 
The introduction of Public Housing Scheme in 1968 that allows members to use their 
CPF savings to pay the HDB housing purchase encouraged Singaporeans to own their 
dwellings.  
 
A similar scheme called Residential Properties Scheme (RPS) applied to private housing 
in 1981.  
 
In 1986, the CPF was further used in the purchase of Non-Residential Properties (called 
Non-Residential Properties Scheme, NRPS).  
 
                                                 
10 The savings in Ordinary Account can be used to buy a home, pay for CPF insurance, investment and 
education. The savings in Special Account are for old age, contingency purposes and investment in 
retirement-related financial products. The savings in Medisave Account can be used for hospitalisation 
expenses and approved medical insurance.  
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At the same time, the Approved Investment Scheme (AIS) was introduced. Thereafter the 
Basic Investment Scheme (BIS) and Enhanced Investment Scheme (EIS) came out in 
1993.  
 
Being consistent with government’s intention for Singaporeans owning their dwellings 
and being share owners and stake holders of the Nation, these CPF schemes also imply 
that members have greater control over what they want to do with their own funds.   
 
Besides the use of the CPF in the home ownership and investment purposes, the CPF also 
provides health/education fund and insurance premiums with relative schemes. After the 
set up of Medisave account in the CPF savings in 1984, Education Scheme started in 
1989 and allows CPF members to finance their own or children’s tertiary education with 
the CPF savings. The period for the repayment plus interest is 10 years beginning from 
one year later after Graduation.  
 
Changes of CPF schemes on housing since 2002 have made the use of CPF savings more 
flexible in home purchasing. Half of the down payment for private housing, now 5% of 
the price, can be paid by buyer’s CPF savings. With effect in 1 July 2005, the Minimum 
Lease Period (MLP) is lowered from 60 to 30 years11. Lowering the MLP thus gives 
members this flexibility so that more funds can be set aside to meet their retirement 
expenditure. In this way, both their housing and retirement needs are better met. Another 
scheme with effect in July 2005 is that all non-related singles (unmarried, divorced or 
                                                 
11 Minimum Lease Period (MLP) refers to the length of lease remaining below which CPF cannot be used 
to purchase private residential properties 
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widowed) will be allowed to use CPF to jointly purchase their only residential properties. 
There is no age restriction. This change will give singles more housing options and is 
aligned to the HDB’s Joint Singles Scheme where singles aged 35 years and above can 
jointly buy HDB flats12. 
 
On the other hand, CPF withdrawal for residential property beyond 100% Valuation 
Limit (VL13) is subject to the lower of Available Housing Withdrawal Limit (AHWL14) 
and 150% of VL. The 150% cap will be reduced gradually from 150% of VL in 2002 to 
120% of VL in 2008. Meanwhile, some restrictions on Use of CPF to purchase Multiple 
Properties will be effect from July 2006. This policy supports the objective of retirement 
adequacy. It would ensure that CPF members set aside at least the Minimum Sum cash 
component for retirement before investing in the second and subsequent properties. 
 
The Non-Residential Properties Scheme will be phased out from 1 July 2006. The CPF 
Board will not accept any applications under the Scheme from 1 July 2006. Members 
who are using CPF to service their non-residential properties before 1 July 2006 will not 





                                                 
12 Source: HDB website, www.hdb.gov.sg 
13 The VL refers to the value of property at the time of purchase or the purchase price, whichever is lower. 
14 For CPF members aged below 55 years, the AHWL is the available Ordinary Account balance after 
setting aside the Minimum Sum cash component. For CPF members aged 55 years and above, the AHWL 








There have been a large volume of studies on housing demand for the past four decades. 
Most of the international literature of housing study we have reviewed uses the individual 
household data (micro data) in United States, e.g. the American Housing Survey (AHS), 
Retirement History Survey (RHS), Federal Housing Administration (FHS), etc. A few 
articles also use the micro data from U.K., e.g. U.K. Family Expenditure Survey 
[Browning and Crossley (2001)], or from Canada [Crossley and Ostrovsky (2003)], or 
from China [Fu et. al (2000)], etc. On the other hand, local researchers base their housing 
study mostly on aggregate data sets. Available data source includes Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA15) statistics. A special review on the Berge and Turner 
(1991) is single out as we observed the Swedish housing market some similar to the 
Singapore housing market in the structure of housing system. It is found in this paper that 
the income redistribution effect induced by housing subsidiary policies is little, quite 
opposite the policy intention.  
 
3.1 International Literature Review 
 
                                                 
15  The Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) is Singapore's national land use planning authority. URA 
prepares long term strategic plans, as well as detailed local area plans, for physical development, and then 
co-ordinates and guides efforts to bring these plans to reality. Prudent land use planning has enabled 
Singapore to enjoy strong economic growth and social cohesion, and ensures that sufficient land is 
safeguarded to support continued economic progress and future development.  Source: www.ura.gov.sg 
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In the economics of housing demand, researchers often concern the income elasticities 
and price elasticites [Goodman (1982, 1984, 1988 and 2002), Hansam et.al (1996), 
Hausman and Wise (1980), Henderson and Ioannides (1986), Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990), 
Rosen (1979), Mayo (1981), Ioannides and Zabel (2001)],   the appropriate functional 
form for housing demand equations [Mayo (1981)], the role of demographic variables 
[Mayo (1981), Goodman (1984, 1988)],   and the dynamic aspects of housing demand 
[Goodman (1995)].  
 
3.1.1 Measured Income & Permanent Income 
 
The difference between the measured income (current income) and the expected income 
(permanent income), when estimating housing demand function, was earliest recognized 
in 1960 [Olsen, (1987)]. With Individual household data available, permanent income is 
estimated by using household demographics including human wealth and non-human 
wealth variables [Goodman and Kawai (1982)]. Measured income is separated into 
permanent income and transitory income that is the residual of the permanent income 
estimation. In Goodman and Kawai (1982), the measured income Y is expressed as sum 
of permanent income and transitory income: TP YYY += , where  PY depends on 
individual’s human wealth and nonhuman wealth: NHY P ψφ += . Human wealth H  is 
related to the household’s demographic factors such as education level, age, etc.  
Nonhuman wealth N includes previous wealth accumulated, car owned, etc.  
 
3.1.2 Income Elasticities and Price Elasticities 
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In the literature of housing studies, income elasticities and price elasticities are less than 
one in absolute value [Olsen (1987)]. It means that housing demand is income-inelastic 
and price-inelastic [Henderson and Ioannides (1985)].  The characteristics of housing 
commodity result that most households do not move in response to small changes in 
income or housing price [Goodman (2002)]. The marginal exception is observed in 
Goodman (1982), that the income and price demand elasticities derived from linear 
regression results are some higher/lower than +1/-1 but quite close to +1/-1. 
 
With individual household data available, the estimates of income elasticities are 
improved, as the permanent income estimated from these data are included in the housing 
demand equation [Goodman and Kawai (1982 & 1984)]. In Goodman and Kawai (1984), 
median permanent income elasticities in all selected metropolitan areas are 77% higher 
than median current income elaticities in the same areas. The exception is, in Goodman 
and Kawai (1988), that current, rather than permanent income provides better results in 
the demand estimates.  
 
Income elasticities and price elaticities between owners and renters are studied in 
Mayo(1981), Goodman and Kawai (1984 and 1988) and Hansen et. al (1996). Similar 
regression results are obtained from housing demand equations. Housing demand of 
owners is more income elastic than that of renters [Hansen et. al (1996)]. However, the 
price elasticities of owners is substantially lower (in absolute value) than those of renters 
[Goodman and Kawai (1984)]. Mayo(1981) explains that a large fraction of the observed 
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owner-renter differences in income elasticities could be accounted for by income 
difference alone. Income elasticities rise and price elasticities fall with incomes when 
linear demand functions are used. Goodman and Kawai (1984) recalculate these 
elasticities based on the income of the other tenure. Results show that values of 
elasticities calculated with tenure-specific incomes overstates the differences between 
housing tenures.  
 
An interesting paper that explores the neighborhood effects on housing demand by 
Ioannides and Zabel (2001) found that the elasticities of individual housing demand, with 
respect to the mean of the neighbors’ housing demands, range from 0.19 to 0.66. And, the 
elasticities of individual housing demand, with respect to the mean of neighbors’ 
permanent incomes, range from 0.17 to 0.54.   
 
3.1.3 Discontinuous Budget Constraints and Housing Demand 
 
Household choice behavior is often presented in terms of preferences and possibilities 
[Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)]. Individual choices are often characterized by 
economists as resulting from maximization of an implicit utility function subject to a 
budget constraint [Hausman and Wise (1980)]. In the theory of economics and consumer 
behavior, the simple linear budget constraint is a basic assumption for a great deal of 
consumer demand analysis, while nonlinear budget constraints arise frequently in 
practice [Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)]. 
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Government programs account for many nonlinearities in budget frontiers [Olsen (1987)]. 
Hausman and Wise (1980) proposes a general method of the estimation based on the 
experimental data which included “housing gap” subsidy plan that effectively created 
discontinuous individual budget constraints. With the same “housing gap” schemes data, 
Venti and Wise (1984) analyze the magnitude of transaction costs and their implications 
for the effects of government subsidy programs. Discontinuous budget constraints with 
capital gains tax are also introduced in Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990). The estimates of the 
elasticities are improved with modeling the capital gains tax even though the coefficient 
difference is not statistically significant. 
 
Earlier studies on the nonlinearity in the budget constraint caused by moving costs are 
reviewed in Olsen (1987). Moving costs, especially of a non-monetary nature, are 
emphasized in these studies. In addition, households with lowest moving costs would 
more likely response their housing consumption to changes in their budget space [Venti 
and Wise (1984)]. 
 
3.1.4 Functional Forms of Housing Demand Equations 
 
Mayo (1981) reviews different functional forms in housing demand estimation. Log-
linear demand equations are evaluated first, with the hypothesis that elasticities of 
demand do not respond to the changes of either income or price variable. The log-linear 
specification is convenient because the coefficients on income and price provide direct 
estimates of the price and income elasticities of demand [Rosen (1979), Hoyt and 
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Rosenthal (1990)]. Mayo(1981) then evaluates the linear demand equation that may 
derive from the Stone-Geary or “displaced Cobb-Douglas” utility function. Linear 
demand equation permits that price and income elasticities vary with both prices and 
income. It also provides an explanation of why elasticity estimates differ between renters 
and owners [Goodman and Kawai (1984)]. 
 
3.1.5 Demographic Effects in Housing Demand 
 
Demand for housing is determined not only by income and housing price but also by 
other household characteristics [Goodman (1982)]. Demographic effects in housing 
demand are reviewed in Mayo (1981). Typically, demographic variables include age of 
household head, household size, numbers of children, educational level and occupation 
category of household head, race and sex of household head, which are either added to 
demand equations in a linear additive way or used as category variables. 
 
In Mankiw and Weil (1989), cross-sectional data are used to examine the link between 
age and housing demand. It is found that individual generates little housing demand until 
age 20. Housing demand rises sharply between ages 20 and 30, and remains flat after age 
30. Housing demand appears to decline after age 40 by about one percent per year.  
 
We have noticed, from the literature, that demographic effects are difficult to be 
compared in different studies. For instance, age has a negative and significant impact in 
Goodman (1988), while it has positive effect on housing demand but not very significant 
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in Rosen (1979). Similarly, the female head of household has positive and significant on 
quantity of housing services in Rosen (1979) and the male head, however, has positive 
but insignificant effect in Goodman (1988).  
 
Besides the demographic factors, some non-human wealth variables, e.g. equity, car, etc., 
are also included in the housing demand equation [Goodman (1982)]. However, the 
inclusion of these wealth variables reduces the effect of permanent income. 
 
3.1.6 Household Mobility Behavior, Life-cycle Effects 
 
Besides household income as an important determinant of the housing consumption, life 
cycle (age), as well as other demographic factors, also has influential effects. It is clear 
that the demand for housing services, the housing consumption, changes significantly 
over the life cycle of any individual household [DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)].  
 
Venti and Wise (1984 and 1990) are among the first researchers to study residential 
mobility of focusing on housing consumption disequilibrium and (psychic) moving 
transaction cost. The disequilibrium occurs when housing consumption and housing 
demand do not match. However, the disequilibrium in housing demand may persist if this 
disequilibrium is not severe enough to overcome the sizable transaction costs that moving 
entails. Venti and Wise (1990) find that moving decision with respect to elder people is 
usually triggered by the changes in retirement, marital, or health status. In such situations, 
the families have much lower (psychic) transaction costs.  
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Households adjust their housing consumption through housing mobility behavior. 
Generally, households’ housing mobility behavior is tenure related household mobility. 
Ioannides(1987) found that personal wealth, housing prices, as well as socioeconomic 
characteristics explain households’ tenure choice and mobility behavior simultaneously. 
In Ioannides and Kan (1996), households’ financial wealth level does not affect the 
mobility behavior, while demographic factors such as age of household head do have 
significant effect on the mobility behavior. With tenure choice and residential mobility as 
a joint decision, one of the two models in Ioannides and Kan (1996) provides more 
details for explaining households’ decision to move and whether to rent or own after 
moving. It was found in Ioannides (1987) and Ioannides and Kan (1996) that higher 
mobility for renters and lower for owners. This point has been widely recognized. 
 
A tenure choice model is also used in Rosenthal (1988) that explores the impacts of 
changes in housing tax policy by accounting for the moving process of households. 
Besides economic and demographic factors, residence times are found to be an important 
consideration in household tenure choice, through their influence on the discounted value 
of legal and realtor fees paid by homeowners.  
 
 With a comprehensive model considering both households housing consumption 
decision and investment decision, Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) found that demographic 
characteristics are primary determinants of tenure choice, whereas taxation factors help to 
determine the size of each owner-occupied house. 
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The tenure choice is also affected by households’ financial status. For example, 
Brueckner (1986) analyzed the role of the down-payment constraint in housing tenure 
choice. The paper explains that households need to sacrifice initial consumption for 
accumulating down-payment, but eventually enjoy the homeownership benefits, resorting 
to long term, relative low risk investment. Johnson (1981) found that household income, 
expected duration of occupancy, liquidity and inflation expectation is the determinants of 
the financial benefits of owning a home. 
 
As above, tenure related mobility serves a personal investment purpose, but it also 
symbolizes the changing of households’ social status [Neo et. al (2003)]. Those with 
higher income, younger household head, senior managerial or professional jobs and those 
who are not be able to access public subsidized housing like to buy commercial homes or 
upgrade to better housing [Fu et al. (2000) and Tu et al. (2005)].  
 
On the other hand, some researchers studied household mobility related to housing 
location choices.  White (1977) presents a model showing that households’ housing and 
non-housing consumption pattern determine their location choices. In Curran et al. (1982), 
it was suggested that the number of workers in a household and the employment locations 
of the workers do affect residential households’ location decisions. In particular, 
Freedman and Kern (1997) explains that women’s earnings opportunities and commuting 
burdens influence on her husband’s job site as well as the household’s location choice. 
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Thus, the socioeconomic factor changes of members in a household may affect a 
household’s housing location choice.   
 
In recent studies, the traditional life-cycle model of consumption and saving has been 
applied to examine the life-cycle effects (or age effects) when households make housing 
consumption decisions [Börsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1990), Sweet (1990), Crossley 
and Ostrovsky (2003)]. Modigliani (1986) explains that permanent income model differ 
from life-cycle model in that it assumes that life is indefinitely long. By recognizing the 
finite life of households, life-cycle model allows systematic variations in income and in 
“needs” which occur over the life cycle. Life-cycle model also takes into account 
bequests and the bequest motive. In the situation that the life-cycle framework is held in 
increasing disrepute with in the economics profession, Browning and Crossley (2001) 
provides a defense of the life-cycle framework as a source of models that can be taken to 
the data. The distinction between the life-cycle framework (or tradition) and particular 
life-cycle models with empirical content are emphasized in their paper. It also comes out 
some ideas for the future research for the life-cycle model by looking at specific features 
of goods, for example, housing.  
 
Simple life-cycle models predict that housing wealth should be dis-saved in later life, and 
housing consumption should also fall as needs diminish (with declining household size). 
The empirical findings in Crossley and Ostrovsky (2003) mildly support this prediction 
of simple life-cycle models. It was found that home ownership declines at older ages, but 
not steeply. Average housing equity declines as well, but more slowly than ownership. In 
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Börsch-Supan and Pollakowski (1990), the estimated age effects indicate that elderly 
households downgrade dwelling size without change tenure.   
 
On the other hand, Venti and Wise (1989 and 2001) argue whether the elder people 
perceive the housing equity as a source of funds for general consumption as they grow 
older. In Venti and Wise (1989), it is observed that the elderly typically do not use saving 
in the form of housing equity to finance current consumption when they aged, that is 
contrary to the usual life-cycle theory. Also, Venti and Wise (2001) find that households 
are unlikely to discontinue home ownership when they become aged. Based on the 
empirical estimation with different sources of data, they find that housing equity either 
increases with age or declines somewhat.  
 
 
3.2 Local Studies Review 
 
As above, housing demand and household choice behavior have been extensively 
researched in United States and some other countries, e.g. U.K., while similar studies 
have not received serious attention in Singapore. In Singapore, housing studies more 
focus on the private housing market trends with available data source, Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) statistics [Lum (1996), Ho and Cuervo (1999), Sing 
(2001), Tu (2004)]. The resale market analysis for public housing has also appeared in 
recent studies [Tu and Wong (2002), Edelstein and Lum (2003), Ong, Ho and Lim 
(2003)]. Moreover, researchers have done extensive studies on the impacts of 
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government policies on housing price dynamics in private property market [Phang and 
Wong (1997), Sing (2001), Lum (2002), ] and in public housing market [Tu and Wong 
(2002)], or on the upward mobility from public housing to private housing [Ong (2000), 
Tu et al.(2005)].  
  
Relating to the main objective of this study that is to understand housing consumption 
demand structure in Singapore, as well as to investigate the life-cycle effects on 
household housing consumption, the previous studies on Singapore housing market are 
believed to bring forth our vision. We will review some articles relevant to our research 
in more details.  
 
3.2.1 Housing Demand and Household Mobility Behavior 
 
The specific structure of housing system in Singapore determines that most of the 
population lives in public housing subsidized by government. Households from low 
income to upper middle income groups usually choose to live in public housing because 
of the down payment constraints and the affordability of the mortgage debt, while the 
smaller groups of households with higher income are accommodated in private housing. 
This leads the residential housing market in Singapore to be viewed as a pyramid with the 
largest stratum encompassing households owning and living in low-end public housing 
[Bardhan et al. (2003)]. Above that, in ascending order are the larger and newer public 
units, executive condominium, entry-level private housing, medium level private housing 
and finally, luxury units, and landed properties. 
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In recent years, the issues related to the upward mobility behaviour of households have 
attracted the attention of many local researchers. In contrast to international experiences, 
Singapore observes a special type of housing related mobility where its public 
homeowners continually seek to upgrade to private housing (Tu et al., 2005). They 
explained that the rising trend of such mobility is driven by the desire of households for 
an image of higher status and the increased accessibility to private housing constrained 
by the large amount of down payment. Regression results show that an existing 
Singapore public homeowner, if the household head is at younger age, or he has the limit 
to access to another public housing unit, but has stable and higher income or smaller 
household size, as well as owns a larger public housing unit, is likely to upgrade to 
private housing. The impacts of household characteristics on the upgrading mobility from 
public flats to private properties are also highlighted in the study by Thang & Ong (2001). 
The study reveals that younger professionals, executives or managerial staffs are more 
likely to upgrade, which is consistent with the latest findings (Tu et al., 2005). Ong (2000) 
indicates this kind of upgrading phenomenon in Singapore supported by the general 
upward trend in the ratio of private to public housing stock. Through the affordability and 
upward mobility model, empirical tests are conducted in Ong (2000) and the results 
imply that the ability to upgrade from public to private housing depends to a large extent 
on legislative and financing regulation. Upward mobility is also reflected by the 
theoretical, then the actual private property price movement, for example, a sharp decline 
in the theoretical property price (that is predicted by the upward mobility model) in the 
second half of 1996 when the anti-speculation regulation introduced, means that public 
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homeowners find it harder to upgrade. Ong & Sing (2002) point out that the private 
housing price volatility is significantly affected by the rising trend of such upward 
mobility. 
 
Upward mobility from public housing to private housing is highly related to the public 
resale market movements. Capital gains from resale of HDB units may be an important 
determinant of upgrading mobility (Bardhan et al., 2003). In this paper, the number of 
new private housing transacted is estimated, depending on three macro economic factors, 
public resale prices and an interaction term, modeling the linkage between the public and 
the private housing markets. The growth in wealth, as well as capital gains in the public 
sector is found to generate upward mobility of households. The link between the public 
resale market and the private housing market is also probed by Tu (2003). She explains 
that the resale market was originally aimed at facilitating consumer housing choices and 
harnessing the greater efficiency of market mechanism in the delivery of public housing. 
However, it has also become a vehicle for many Singapore households to upgrade to 
private housing.  
 
As well-known, the ability to afford/own private housing in Singapore is limited by the 
scarcity of land and understandably, high prices (Ong, 2000). Hence, owning a private 
property has become “the Singapore Dream”. The accepted wisdom is that the path 
toward ownership of private property is to purchase a HDB flat first, and to upgrade 
subsequently (Lum, 1996).       
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In a government study on household mobility during the 1991-1995, upgrading refers to a 
HDB/HUDC resident private household which had shifted from a lower category to a 
higher category of dwelling unit during the 1991-1995, while downgrading refers to a 
resident private household which had shifted from a higher to lower category of dwelling 
unit during the 1991-1995. It is found that majority of households which upgraded were 
headed by younger married males, had larger household size and higher household 
income. Conversely, downgrading households tend to be older households with smaller 
household size and lower household income. 
 
3.2.2 Government Policies and Housing Mobility 
 
As mentioned earlier, almost every study on housing market in Singapore does include 
the impacts of government policies. In fact, housing mobility behavior is interacted with 
housing price movements. For instance, the price appreciation in both public and private 
housing markets enhances household upward mobility behavior. The reason may be that 
households expect more capital gains by purchasing larger housing units. We could say 
any government policies that have impacts on housing prices would influence the housing 
mobility behavior.  
 
In Phang and Wong (1997), the impacts of government policies on private housing prices 
were empirically analyzed and the results revealed that the timing of government policies 
relating to the use of compulsory savings for private housing finance, the liberalization of 
rules on public housing ownership criterion as well as for the change in maximum HDB 
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loan amount have significant impacts on private housing prices. On the other hand, Tu 
and Wong (2002), in their study on “Public Policies and Public Resale Housing Prices in 
Singapore”, selected ten major public housing policies between 1990 and 2003 and found 
that the prices of public resale housing are largely determined by public policies rather 
than by economic variables. Out of all the public housing policies, the HDB 
Liberalization of Finance Terms policy issued in April 1993 appears to have strongest 
impacts on public resale housing prices.  Tu (2003) further extended the study by 
empirically testing how the public resold dwellings impact on private housing prices. She 
found that the public resale housing market is relatively self- determined mainly driven 
by public housing prices, while the private housing market, to some extent, depends on 
the performance of the public resale market. In particular, the HDB Liberalization of 
Finance Terms policy made significant contributions to the boom of both the public 
resale and the private real housing prices in the mid of 1990s. The rising public resale 
housing prices further increased a public homeowner’s capital gain at the time of sale, 
and hence increasing the accessibility to private housing. Lum (2002) also included this 
policy variable in her study. It is found that the package of deregulatory measures in the 
public housing market was an important determinant of the price adjustment process.  
 
The impacts of anti-speculation measurements issued in May 1996 were tested in several 
studies [Ong (2000), Sing (2001), Tu and Wong (2002) and Tu (2003)]. Under this rule, a 
“Stamp Duty” was made payable on transactions of both public and private housing units 
[Tu and Wong(2002)]. Moreover, purchases of private property have to pay a minimum 
of 20% of the property price in cash (previously 10% of price). It means that HDB flat 
owners would find it harder to upgrade (Ong, 2000). Understandably, this policy, 
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together with the increment of the supply of residential lands was found to be effective in 
dampening condominium prices (Sing, 2001). The impact of anti-speculation 
measurements is much higher on the private housing market than on the public resale 
housing market because the public resale homebuyers are regulated by the minimum 
occupancy period (Tu, 2003). 
 
The recent study by Neo, Lee and Ong (2003) explored the change in Central Provident 
Fund (CPF) policy on 1 September 2002, on household mobility in general and on the 
affordability and accessibility of potential home-buyers in particular. They found that the 
improvement in accessibility by allowing the use of CPF for down payment may 
stimulate demand at the cost of higher financial risk to home-buyers and mortgage 
lenders, considering the reduced affordability by the imposition of a limit on the use of 





In a whole, researches on Singapore housing market, according to available literature, are 
based on aggregate data sets. Completed topics mainly focus on the price movement in 
private and public resale housing markets as well as the government policy effects. 
Upward housing mobility behavior from public flats to private housing are explored and 
the bulk proceeds from selling public flats with high subsidies in the resale market  
provide the large amount of cash down payment for the upgraders.  
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To our knowledge, there are few papers from micro perspective with individual 
household data that examine the housing consumption behavior and how the market 
constraints or policy restrictions affect households’ housing consumption choices.   
 
 
3.3 Housing Subsidy Program – A Swedish Case Review 
 
We summarize the main points of the study by Berger and Turner (1991) talking about 
Swedish housing market and housing subsidy program as follows. As we observed, 
Swedish housing system is similar to the Singapore housing system in some aspects. 
From this study, we see that the government intention of redistribution of income through 
housing subsidy program have little effect. 
 
3.3.1 Housing Tenure Forms 
 
There are three tenure forms in Swedish housing sector. 43% of the dwellings belong to a 
rental sector, split into private and municipal rental sub-sectors of approximately equal 
size. Rents are fixed by a “Fair Rent System”, which means that a user’s value, decided 
on administrative grounds, determines the rents. It sometimes coincides with a market 
value, but will more often create excess demand for centrally located dwellings and 
excess supply of built dwellings during the late 1980s’. Regulated allocation of rental 
dwellings is also available to cater the families who have children and those who have 
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spent a long time in the rental queue, though part of the rental market is open to the 
landlord’s own decisions on whom to accept as a tenant. On the other hand, the 
ownership sector, which occupies 42% of the dwellings, is free to let sellers determine 
the prices and choose future owners. In the end, the cooperative sector contained 15% of 
dwellings (534,000 of total 3,670,000) in 1985.  
 
3.3.2 The Cooperative Sector 
 
The cooperative sector is a substitute for the rental sector when the housing consumption 
aspect is important. The cooperative sector on the other hand is a substitute to the 
ownership sector for those households where the investment aspect of housing is apt to be 
important. Some aged owners in the ownership sector like to downsize to the cooperative 
dwellings from their single-family housing either for living or investment purpose. Such 
kind of demand for the cooperative dwellings may explain part of the high price inflation 
of well-located cooperative dwellings.  
 
The term, the cooperative, can be explained that, when a building project is finished, a 
tenant-owner cooperative is established. Members in the cooperative association make an 
initial down payment in the case of a new cooperative dwelling and own the estate 
collectively. Then members pay a “rent” for living, which corresponds to the sum of 
maintenance costs and historically determined capital expenditure on loans issued to the 
cooperative on a collective basis. The down payment for a cooperative dwelling is set on 
an expenditure basis, irrespective of the (implicit) market price. Besides the way of 
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obtaining a cooperative dwelling in new construction as discussed above, households also 
can buy used dwellings in a free market where all units are bought and sold with a 
transaction price determined by market conditions. The transaction price usually exceeds 
the down payment so substantial gains accrue to those achieving a dwelling through the 
queue. 
 
3.3.3 Windfall Gains & Policy Intention 
 
The existing windfall gains create an incentive to queue for a cooperative dwelling. 
Queuing is open to all households, whether or not they already have a cooperative 
dwelling. The queuing time, however, is quite long. Especially in certain areas, the 
queuing time may be above ten years.  
 
The close interaction with other housing markets explains why excess demand for 
cooperative dwellings arises. For the interest of the cooperative companies’ behavior, it is 
safer to satisfy a part of the queue and maintain a situation with excess demand. Thus, the 
risk of creating vacant dwellings will be minimized since losses due to vacancies are a 
heavy burden on the cooperatives.  
 
Capital gains taxation is implemented to prevent households from a speculative selling of 
the dwelling immediately after a purchase. The capital gains tax decreases with the length 
of the occupation. 
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Which households will receive these windfall gains?  Using a logit regression analysis, 
Burger and Turner (1991) found that the probability of acquiring a dwelling through the 
queue, and thus capturing the windfall gain, is positively correlated with income and 
family size. Therefore, the cooperative queues do not have a redistributive effect on 
wealth in society, quite opposite the housing policy intention upon which the Swedish 




                                                 
∗ Besides the cooperative dwellings we discussed, there is also an interest subsidy given to the recent built 
cooperative dwellings and to all other tenure form in Sweden. So the interest subsidy system is complex 










The Singapore Department of Statistics (DOS) conducts the Household Expenditure 
Survey (HES) once in every five years since 1972/73. Our data source is the seventh HES 
in the series that was conducted by DOS from November 1997 to October 1998.  
 
The main objective of the HES is to collect detailed information on the latest 
consumption expenditure of private households. The HES also obtained additional data 
on the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the households, as well as the 
ownership of consumer durables, investments and assets among private households in 
Singapore16.  
 
The data collected in the 1997/1998 covers 5555 households in which only 41 households 
are headed by foreigners and 342 households are headed by Singapore Permanent 
                                                 
16 Reference: Report on the Household Expenditure Survey 1997/98, ISSN 0217-9563. Department of 
Statistics, Ministry of Trade & Industry, Republic of Singapore 
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Residents17. In this section, we explain briefly the variables extracted from the survey 
that may affect households’ housing consumption behavior and do summary statistics. 
 
 
4.2 Households’ Housing Types and Tenure Structure 
 
The HES data have detailed households’ housing type information. A large proportion of 
the households who live in HDB 3-room flat and above, or private housing own their 
dwellings. For the households who owned their dwellings during the survey period, only 
23 of them are headed by foreigners, in which 19 households lived in public housing. 
One possible reason is that the MIE of these 19 households married Singaporeans so they 
can own public housing at the time. The ownership rate of HDB 1- and 2-room flats is the 
lowest. It may be explained that HDB 1- and 2-room flats are mainly rented to the 
poorest families. The type of “Others” includes shop houses, labor quarters, non-HDB 
public flats and attap houses. As our empirical study focuses on homeowners, we exclude 











                                                 
17 In this study, we define household head as the Main Income Earner (MIE) of a household. MIE is 
defined as the household member with the highest personal income. 
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Table 4.1: Home Tenure Rate by Housing Types 
 
 
 Ownership Rental Others  





Others 64.0% 32 36.0% 18 0 0
HDB 1-2 room 8.9% 20 90.7% 205 0.44 1
HDB 3 room 96.5% 1503 3.4% 53 0.13 2
HDB 4 room 98.6% 1913 1.3% 25 0.15 3
HDB 5 room & 
Executive flat 98.9% 1190 0.83% 10 0.25 3
Private18  93.4% 539 4.7% 27 1.91 11
Total 93.6% 5197 6.09% 338 0.36 20
 
      Source: Housing Expenditure Survey in 1997/1998. Calculated by author. 
 
 
4.3 Owner Occupied Housing: Purchase Year Distribution 
 
Demand for home ownership increased significantly after 1968 when the CPF was 
allowed to purchase public homes. As the CPF was liberalized to purchase private 
properties in 1981, as well as the CPF contribution rate reached the peak from 1984 to 
1986, the trends of demand for home ownership proceeded continually. In our sample, 
85.9% of the owner occupied houses were purchased during 1980~1998. Another 12.2% 
are purchased from1971 to 1979. Only 1.9% of owner occupied houses were purchased 
before 1970. Respectively, 86.1% of HDB flats, 83.9% of private houses and 90.6% of 
other types of houses were purchased during 1980 and 1998. 
                                                 
18 Private dwelling includes private apartment, privatized HUDC, private condominium and landed housing. 
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Table 4.2: Owner Occupied Housing purchased by Year Interval and by Types    




interval 1-or 2-room 3room 4room 
5room & 
executive flats
Private  Others  Total  
1950~1959 0 1 0 0 15 0 16
1960~1969 2 40 1 0 39 0 82
1970~1979 2 357 186 54 33 3 635
1980~1989 8 637 853 357 164 11 2030
1990~1999 8 468 873 779 288 18 2434
Total 20 1503 1913 1190 539 32 5197
 
  Source: Housing Expenditure Survey in 1997/1998. Calculated by author. 
 
 
As our objective is to explore the difference of individual life-cycle choice of housing 
consumption in terms of two different market constraints, we focus our empirical study 
on the homeowners who bought their current home since 1990. For the sample that 
households purchased their current homes during 1980 to 1989, we could not make 
similar investigation since we do not have household groups under different market 
constraints for comparison. As elaborated in Chapter 1, the public housing market was 
dominated by the new HDB housing sector before the implementation of liberalized 
policy for the resale market in the late 1989.    
 
 
4.4 Data Limitation 
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As the main objective of this study is to investigate the housing consumption profile over 
individual’s life-cycle window in terms of different market conditions, whether a home 
purchase is a new flat purchase directly from HDB or a resale flat purchase from the open 
market draws our attention in the first place. However, our data does not indicate such 
information. Refer to the earlier paper by Lum and Fu(2004), we calculate the purchase 
price of a HDB flat relative to the resale market value of the property19, pr_pur/valuation.  
By comparing pr_pur/valuation with the average price of new HDB flats of the same 
type relative to the market valuation during the year of purchase, we identify a purchase 
deemed as a new HDB sale if the pr_pur/valuation is at or below the corresponding ratio 
for new HDB flats.  
 
The new flat indicator variable calculated in this study may not reflect the real nature of 
each housing transaction in the market. This could bias our empirical results by some 
extent. Nevertheless, the indicator variable is still reliable because we carefully choose 
the market data used in the calculation and very cautiously discern the potential factor to 
cause any identification error. This is the best we can do with available data. 
 
 
4.5 Sample Definition 
 
                                                 
19 We use the average HDB resale price by region, by type, and the year as the resale market value of the 
property in each purchase year.  
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In addition, housing consumption profile of private homeowners differs from that of 
HDB flat owners in terms of the market conditions. This study focuses on the HDB home 
dwellers.  
  
Our total sample size is 2,075 observations. According to our calculation, about 523 
households bought new flats while 1550 households bought their houses from the resale 
market. Among our sample, approximately 61% of the new flat buyers bought 5-room 
flats and above, 36% of the new flat buyers bought 4-room flats and only 3% of them 
bought 3-room flats. Approximately 42% of the resale flat buyers bought 4-room flats 
and the rest of them are equally distributed to buy 3-room flats and 5-room flats (or 
above). Dwelling size increases with average household size. The average or median ages 
of household Main Income Earner (MIE) at the time of purchase20 across housing types 
are also presented in Table 4.3. For each type of housing, the average or median age of 
MIE at the time of purchase is higher if the flat was purchased from resale market. We 
may infer, from this simple statistic result, that households would reach the peak of 
housing consumption demand at earlier life stage if they purchase homes from new HDB 








                                                 
20 From the HES cross-sectional individual household data, we obtain the age of the households’ Main 
Income Earner (MIE) at the time of housing purchase. 
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Table 4.3: Sample Profile at the Time of Purchase by Housing Types 
 
New flat buyers (525 observations) Resale flat buyers (1550 observations) 
Housing 


















3-room 3.24 3.35 36.7 35 28.19 3.44 36.7 36 




60.57 4.16 34.6 33 29.42 4.18 36.3 36 
Total  100 4.06 34.5 33 100 3.89 35.9 35 
 
(Sample includes those households who are home buyers of 3-room flats and above after 
the year 1990. The households with MIE aged below 21 at the time of purchase are 









5.1 Description of Households’ Life-cycle Housing Consumption  
 
Simple life-cycle models predict that housing wealth should be dis-saved in later life, and 
housing consumption should also fall as needs diminish (with declining household size) 
[Crossley and Ostrovsky(2003)]. In particular, for the owner-occupied housing, as the 
down payment as well as the installment may be the potential constraints for younger 
couples to obtain large accommodations from a free market, the housing consumption 
demand level is expected to increase during the earlier life stages of household head and 
reach the peak at certain age. The hypothesis of life-cycle consumption pattern implies 
that housing consumption would increase with the age of household head till certain life 
stage and declines thereafter. Figure 5.1 shows an expected housing consumption profile 
over individual’s life-cycle window. A demand function with a quadrate term of the age 
of the household head is used to describe the housing consumption profile.   
 
  ( ) 2210 tataatf ++=     (1) 
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where, t is the age of the household head. The housing consumption ( )tf  reaches the 





at   (2) 
 
 
5.2 Housing Consumption Choice under Two Different Market Constraints 
 
Housing adjustment process is subject to the market conditions. In a more restricted 
market, the housing adjustment cost is higher. Households would consider their long term 
needs when they make housing consumption decisions. Such households reach the peak 
of housing consumption at earlier life of a household head (the dashed line in Figure 5.1). 
On the other hand, in a more liberalized market, the housing adjustment cost is relatively 
lower. Households usually make housing consumption decisions by looking at the 
different need phases over life-cycle window (the solid line in Figure 5.1). Therefore the 
housing consumption profile with respect to the high adjustment cost (then the long 


















In Singapore context, the minimum occupied period is five years for the new-flat owners, 
but only two and half years for the resale owners. Under this regulation, housing 
adjustment cost would be higher for new buyers than for resale buyers. The higher 
housing adjustment cost would motivate the new-flat buyers to choose flat size according 
to their longer-term housing needs in anticipation of longer occupancy period. The above 
discussion implies, ∗∗ < resalenew tt  . Assume 2a is constant for the new HDB flat market and 
the resale market. Then, resalenew aa ,1,1 < . If we compare the housing consumption choice 
behavior between new flat buyers and resale flat buyers in the empirical analysis, we 
need to add a dummy for identifying any new HDB flats, as well as its interaction with t ,  
to the equation (1). 
 
















Housing consumption profile 
with long adjustment interval 
Housing consumption profile 
with short adjustment interval 
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Therefore, the hypothesis means that 0* '1 <anew  . 
 
 
5.3 Housing Consumption under the Assumption of More Dynamic Households and  
      Less Dynamic Households  
 
In addition to the minimum occupancy regulation, there is an income ceiling to restrict 
higher income households to buy new flats. This regulation would affect households’ 
life-cycle housing choice. Especially it would significantly affect those households with 
high potential growth of income. Such households usually have more dynamic housing 
consumption preference. From the literature, people attaining higher education 
qualification or with higher income are expected to have higher upgrading mobility [Fu et. 
al(2000) and Tu et. al(2005)]. Ioannides(1987) also explains that educated households 
heads are more mobile.  
 
In general, for more dynamic household group, we expect more significant difference in 
life-cycle housing choice between new-flat buyers and resale buyers under the minimum 
occupancy regulation and the income ceiling criteria. There are two possible reasons 
behind this hypothesis. First, dynamic households may consider the difference of the 
minimum occupied period between the new HDB home buyers and the resale flat 
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buyers21 as a disadvantage when they are making housing consumption decisions. For the 
households of lower income or with less educated household heads, they reach the peak 
of the housing consumption at later life. The difference of the minimum occupied period 
is not an important factor to affect their housing consumption decisions since they live 
their homes usually for a long period.  
 
Second, the income ceiling criteria for accessing to new HDB flats may arouse a high 
demand for large new flats from young and educated couples. The desire to receive 
housing subsidies would encourage young professionals to purchase large new flats 
sooner before they reach their income potential to avoid the income ceiling constraint. 
These couples consume more housing than they really need at the time.  
 
These regulations distort households’ housing consumption choices. Without the 
restrictions for home purchasers, a household would choose to buy a large home when 
they really need it, e.g., the family size gets bigger. Figure 5.2 presents an expected 
difference of housing consumption profile between the households of more dynamic and 








                                                 
21 Referring to the footnote 3 in Chapter one, since 1994, the resale flat buyers under CPF cash grant 
scheme also need to occupy  their dwellings at least five years. This scheme was popular in 1996 and 1997 
when the queue for the new flats were very long. In fact, the lock-in time for new-flat buyers would include 
both the minimum occupancy period (5 years) and the queuing time (from registration for purchase to the 
possession of the flat), which is longer than the lock-in time for resale even with the grant. 


























5.4 Further Hypothesis of Life-cycle Housing Consumption for More Dynamic     
      Households 
 
We further look at the housing consumption preference of dynamic households. With 
high potential growth of income, some of the households that expect their income to 
reach the income ceiling in a few years want to access to large new flats at earlier life. 
The rest, however, does not expect their income go up quickly. They show more patience 
in housing consumption and do not like to over consume the housing. They may choose 
to buy small resale flats first at favorite locations and, for a period later, move to large 
new units when their housing needs increase. Based on this hypothesis, we expect a quick 
increase in housing consumption till the peak. The housing consumption would remain at 
Housing consumption profile 













Housing consumption profile 




















the peak for some period as other patient households would reach the peak relatively later. 
We assume the consumption choice to reach a plateau and then examine whether the shift 
in life cycle housing choice exists between new-flat buyers and resale flat buyers. Figure 
5.3 shows our hypothesis. 
 
Figure 5.3: Housing Consumption under the Assumption of Consumption Choice  
                    Reaching a Plateau  
     
 
We use the log term of age to describe the above housing consumption hypothesis. For 
the resale-flat buyers, the housing consumption with log term is as, 
 
    ( ) ( )tatf log1=               (4) 
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 ∆+=∆+=∆+ 1111 log1loglog        (5) 
when 
t
t∆ is small relative to 1. 
 
In order to examine the difference between two types of buyers, we add the new-flat 
indicator variable in the equation, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )tanewnewtatf 1log 11 ′∗++=    (6) 
 
The hypothesis implies, 0>′∗ anew . 
In particular, the difference, ∆t, can be derived from equation 5 and 6 as, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )111111111 log)1)((1log1log aatataatataatattf ′+=′+≅′+=∆+   (7) 
 
from the equation 5 and 7, we get ∆t, 
     












6.1 Two Measurements of Housing Consumption 
 
Housing consumption measurement in this empirical study is firstly based on Net 
Assessed Value22 (NAV). Log-linear regression model is used for the estimation23. NAV 
may not fully reflect the market valuation with respect to the consumption value of 
different flat types24. Alternatively, housing consumption is defined as flat types. With 
the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, ordered choice model is used. 
 
 
6.2 Model Specifications 
 
                                                 
22 Net Assessed Value (NAV) is the Annual Assessed Value that is determined by the Internal Revenue 
Authority of Singapore (IRAS) as the estimated annual rent that a house can fetch if rented out and forms 
the basis for property tax divided by 12. The Annual Assessed Values of HDB flats we use in this study 
were revised in 1990.  
23 Refer to the literature review in chapter three (3.1.4), we follow Mayo(1981), Rosen(1979) and Hoyt and 
Rosenthal(1990) to use log-linear regression  model to estimate the housing demand equation when the 
dependent variable is a continuous number.  
24 The imputed rents that are measured by the annual assessed value (AAV) are underestimated in official 
statistics [Phang(2000)]. And, the state tends to be more conservative in ascribing AAVs for HDB flats 
[Lum and Fu(2004)]. The concern over the measure of housing consumption using NAV still draws our 
attention. The measurement could be improved if the market rentals of the owner-occupied housing in our 
sample during each purchase year are used. We keep this measure of housing consumption in the study at 
the moment because of the tight time schedule and the data collection cost as well. The regression results 
from this measurement are consistent with the results from ordered choice model.    
Chapter 6: Empirical Model Specification 
 49
We define HC as the dependent variable, the housing consumption based on NAV. 
Independent variables include permanent income (the expected household income from 
work) and current income (the measured household monthly total income minus net 
assessed value, or imputed rent), some demographic factors such as age, household size, 
or race. We use dummy variables for indicating the purchase year of each dwelling. 
These year dummies try to capture the year effects at the purchase time that may include 
price volatility of housing, or policy effects, etc. According to the equation (1) in Chapter 














,_,,2_,__,_ ,    (9)  
                  
 
where, i  is the cross-sectional individual. We use age of households’ main income earner 
(MIE) at the time of home purchase," purage _ ", in the empirical model. The use of age 
at the time of purchase is better than current age to capture individual household’s 
housing consumption choice behavior. The quadratic term, 2_ ∧purage , is used to 
capture the marginal age effect on the housing consumption demand. The coefficient of 
2_ ∧purage  is expected to be negative, reflecting the diminishing marginal effect of age 
on the housing consumption demand. iZ , represent other household demographic 
characteristics, including household size or race of MIE. imp _ , is purchase price 
relative to market valuation at the time of purchase, capturing the individual transaction 
information. consex _ , is used to reflect the income effect that is induced by housing 
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subsidies but is not captured by our income variable [Lum and Fu (2004)]. DGP , is a 
dummy variable to indicate the region 25  in which a flat is located. We include 
finaninv _ as an independent variable to explain whether a household whose family 
members hold any financial assets would consume more housing services.  
 
As we want to make a comparison of housing consumption adjustment behavior between 
new flat buyers and resale flat buyers, we add the new HDB flat indicator, inw , as well as 
its interaction with ipurage _ , " inw * ipurage _ ", to the equation (9). Then the housing 














,2_,_*,,__,_ ,   (10) 
          
As in equation (3), the hypothesis on housing consumption implies, 0* '1 <anew . This is 
equivalent with the coefficient of ii puragenw _*  in equation (10) to be negative. 
 
Alternatively, housing consumption demand is measured by housing types structured as a 
housing ladder26. We use housing type variable, HT , to substitute HC in equation (9) 
                                                 
25 Based on the Development Guide Plans (DGP) of Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Singapore, 
Singapore is divided into 55 DGPs, which are categorized in 5 main regions, West Region, East Region, 
Central Region, North Region and North East Region. Our data only indicates each of the five regions 
where a flat is located. 
26 See Appendix 1 for the housing ladder explanation. 
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and (10). For the ordinal nature of the dependant variables27, ordered-choice model is 
used to measure the substituted equations. 
 
To examine the further hypothesis of life-cycle housing consumption of more dynamic 












),_/1(*,),_log(_,_ ,   (11) 
 
 
6.4 Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
Table 6.1 contains the definitions of the variables selected for estimating the housing 
consumption demand and Table 6.2 describes sample statistics of the variables.  
 
Sample further excludes those households with MIE aged (at the time of home purchase) 
over 6028 ( 60_ ≥ipurage ). The observations for this category are relatively small, 1.0% 
of our previously selected sample (21 observations relative to 2,075 observations). 
Respectively, 0.2% of households dwelling in new HDB flats and 1.2% of households 
dwelling in resale flats are excluded.   
                                                 
27 Housing ladder feature is, to some extent, like the ordinal nature of numbers.  
28 Those households with MIE aged over 60 at the time of home purchase are excluded because the MIE 
aged over 60 are less likely to buy and the real incentive for home buying can be result from other 
household members of the household. The concern is that some older people may downgrade their private 
housing and buy resale flats from the public housing market. We have taken this into consideration. The 
housing consumption behaviour for such category of aged people may not follow the trend we expect from 
the general public home owners. As the total number of households with MIE aged over 60 is quite small, 
the exclusion of these households will not affect the main results of this study.      
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Table 6.1: Definitions of Variables 
Variables  Definition 
HC Housing consumption demand; the imputed rent plus the expenditure 
on maintenance and conservancy charges.  
HT Dwelling types indicator: 1= 1- or 2-room flats; 2=3-room flats; 3=4-
room flats; 4=5-room or executive flats
p_inc Households’ permanent income: the expected household income from 
work  
c_inc Households’ current income: current monthly household total income 
minus net assessed value (annual assessed value divided by 12) 
age_pur Age of households’ Main Income Earner at the time of home purchase 
hsz Household size: the number of household member 
race_malay Dummy variable: 1 if MIE is malay 
race_other Dummy variable:  1 if MIE is Indians or other races (non-Malay and 
non-Chinese) 
race_default Default race group: MIE is Chinese 
inv_finan Dummy variable: 1 if at least one household member holds stocks or 
unit trusts  
year_k Dummy variable group, k indicates one of  the years from 1990 to 1998 
except the default year: 1 if the year of housing purchase equals k   
year_default Default year of the purchase group: we set year 1990 as default for our 
selected sample. 
nw Dummy variable: 1 if the property is purchased directly from HDB.  
p_m Purchase price relative to market value of the property at the time of 
purchase. It is same as pr_pur/valuation in chapter 4, “Data Summary”. 
hh_cons Household total monthly expenditure minus expenditure on household 
durables and vehicle purchase. 
ex_cons Excess consumption: Residual of ln(hh_cons), see Appendix 4. 
DGP_l Dummy variable group, l indicates one of the five main regions of 
Singapore, WR, ER, CR, NR and NER: 1 if the region of a flat  equals 
l. 
DGP_default Default region group: a flat is located in CR. 
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Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
 
(Sample includes the households who are home buyers of HDB 3-room flats and above after the year 1990. The households 
with MIEs aged below 21 or over 60 at the time of home purchase are excluded. The total sample size is 2054 observations. ) 
 
Sample mean by age group at the time of purchase All 
Variables 
21~24 25~29 30~34 35~39 40~44 45~49 50~59 Mean Std. dev. 
HC 360 405 406 398 404 422 390 401 126 
HT 2.89 3.22 3.22 3.11 3.17 3.25 2.98 3.16 0.75 
p_inc29 2,967 3,235 3,816 3,441 3,067 3,143 3,258 3,380 1,974 
c_inc 4,303 5,205 5,098 4,243 3,868 4,254 3,961 4,586 3,327 
age_pur 22.96 27.32 32.02 36.95 41.72 46.69 53.14 35.22 7.59 
hsz 4.03 3.69 3.86 4.11 4.16 4.06 3.78 3.95 1.36 
race_malay 0.21 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.36 
race_other 0.078 0.073 0.12 0.081 0.10 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.30 
inv_finan 0.72 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.73 0.66 0.76 0.42 
year_pur 1993.4 1993.7 1994.2 1994.3 1994.3 1995.0 1994.8 1994.2 2.2 
p_m 0.94 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.92 0.89 0.28 
hh_cons 2,970 3,034 2,975 2,834 2,921 3,258 3,197 2,980 1,758 
ex_cons        0 0.40 
No. of observations 115 409 521 444 311 160 94 2054  
                                                 








In this chapter, we first estimate the household permanent income, as well as the excess 
consumption. Then we estimate individual household’s housing consumption and 
examine the difference in life-cycle housing choice between new-flat buyers and resale 
buyers. For enhancing our empirical results, we use linear regression as well as ordered-
choice model.    
 
 
7.1 Estimation of Permanent Income 
 
Following the earlier paper by Lum & Fu (2004), the permanent income of a household is 
defined as the income from work that the household expects to earn in the future given 
the human capital assets of its members and other selected demographic characteristics. 
Human capital assets mainly include the education level or the year of schooling of the 
household members. The HES data provides the human capital characteristics of 
household Main Income Earner (MIE). Sample includes all households in HES that is 
5555 observations. The dependent variable, the household income from work, inc_wk, 
refers to the income contributed by all household members. Refer to HES data, 
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demographic factors of household MIE are used to estimate the expected household 
income from work. The variable definitions and sample statistics are presented in Table 
A3.1 (in Appendix 3).  
  
Table A3.2 reports the regression results of estimating household income from work. 
Education and occupation category variables have expected signs and the coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. The education level is represented by the highest 
qualification attained by Main Income Earner (MIE) of a household. Averagely, 
households whose MIE attained tertiary education have the highest permanent income, 
while those households whose MIE’s highest qualification are below primary school have 
the lowest permanent income. Similarly, households whose MIE has managerial or 
professional job rank top in the range of income, whereas those with MIE as agricultural 
or fishery workers or production and related workers (see Table A3.1 for the variable 
definition) are at the bottom of income level. The age variable has the expected sign and 
also significant. Age*Age is included to capture nonlinear effect of the age variable on 
permanent income [Goodman and Kawai(1982)]. The coefficient of Age*Age is negative, 
reflecting the diminishing marginal age effect on permanent income. The household size 
significantly affects the permanent income level.  
 
Furthermore, we think about the expectation of permanent income may be different for 
people who bought the property in different years as the labor productivity was rising 
quickly during the 1990s. That means people with same human capital are able to be 
more productive in 1997 than in 1990. We create an adjusted permanent income, equal to 
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the 1997 permanent income, calculated from the estimation results that are reported in the 
Appendix 3, multiplied by a productivity index30. 
 
Figure 7.1 presents the median current (or measured) income, permanent income and 
adjusted permanent income across current age groups. As expected, the permanent 
income (or the expected household income from work) is more smoothing compared to 
the current income. However, households’ current income and permanent income, as well 
as adjusted permanent income, decrease sharply after MIEs aged over 60.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: Permanent Income/Adjusted Permanent Income and Current Income  
















                                                 
30 We use the manufacturing labor productivity index for Singapore (1998=1). The productivity index we 
used is equal to the manufacturing labor productivity index multiplied by the purchase year of housing.  
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7.2 Estimation of Excess Consumption 
 
Refer to Lum and Fu(2004), we regress the total household consumption, hh_cons, 
defined as the total monthly household expenditure on consumption other than household 
durables and vehicle purchases on the permanent and current income, as well as a few 
demographic variables. Regression results are reported in Appendix 4. The residual of the 
regression, ex_cons, is to represent the income effect induced by housing subsidies. 
 
 
7.3 Estimation of Housing Consumption: Life-cycle Choice under Two Different  
      Market Constraints 
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, housing consumption is measured either by imputed rent or 
the housing ladder indicators31. Regression results with OLS and ordered-choice model 
are reported in table 7.1. 
 
7.3.1 Regression Results with OLS 
 
The first three columns of table 7.1 reports, respectively, the regression results with 
DGP_l and ex_cons, or with DGP_l, or without DGP_l and ex_cons in the equations. The 
coefficients of all the age-related variables have expected signs. And also, the coefficients 
are significant at less than 10% level except the coefficient of ii puragenw _*   in the 
                                                 
31 Please refer to the definition of HT in Chapter 6. 
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equation with DGP_l and ex_cons. This suggests the difference of the life-cycle housing 
consumption choice do exist between new-flat buyers and resale buyers32. In particular, 
the new flat buyers reach the peak of housing consumption earlier than the resale flat 
buyers, which is consistent with our first hypothesis.  
 
Refer to the equation (2) in Chapter 5.1, we present the values of 
∗∗∆ resalenew tandtt, from each regression in the last three rows of table 7.1. All these 
values indicate the shift of the housing consumption profile of new-flat buyers, while the 
volumes of the difference are uncertain among the three scenarios.  
 
We do not observe the obvious effect of the CPF cash grant scheme launched in 1994 
from our regression results. The shift in the lifecycle housing choice between the new and 
resale flat buyers exists during 1991~19998. The lock-in time for new-flat buyers that 
would include both the minimum occupancy period (5 years) and the queuing time (from 
registration for purchase to the possession of the flat), which is longer than the lock-in 
time for resale even with the cash grant could explain the existence of the shift. The other 
possible reason is that the home purchase with cash grant was popular only in 1996 and 
1997 (according to our knowledge) when the queue for new flats was very long. Thus, 
the effect of the scheme is not obvious in this study.   
 
                                                 
32 The negative sign of the coefficient of age_pur^2 in table 7.1 means that the household housing 
consumption profile has invert U-shape. Meanwhile, the negative sign of the coefficient of nw*age_pur in 
table 7.1 means that the ∗newt <
∗
resalet . That is, the new-flat buyers reach the peak of housing consumption 
earlier than the resale-flat buyers. Refer to Chapter 5.2 for details. 
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With linear regression method, the results from the regression equation with DGP_l are 
shown to be more reasonable with smaller values of ∆t. We do not expect two much 
differences between the new and resale flat buyers since the minimum occupied periods 
do not differ by a large extent.    
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Table 7.1: Estimates of Housing Consumption --- Life-cycle Choice under Two Different Market Constraints 
(Sample further excludes those four households that have housing consumption not less than S$100033. The total sample is 2050 
observations. z statistics in parentheses for ordered probit regression equations are based on QML Huber/White standard errors & 
covariance. t statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors & covariance.) 
 
Estimation Equation OLS Ordered Probit 
Dependent Variable Ln(HC) HT 
 Coefficient(t-Statistic) Coefficient(z-Statistic) 
Constant 3.263591 (25.6) 3.271084 (25.2) 3.377032 (30.5)      
ln(p_inc) 0.184759 (13.4) 0.185326 (13.2) 0.188237 (13.4) 0.895985 (12.1) 0.879252 (11.9) 0.887923 (12.1) 
ln(c_inc) 0.078944 (7.9) 0.077410 (7.6) 0.075791 (7.5) 0.362387 (6.9) 0.348447 (6.6) 0.330565 (6.4) 
age_pur 0.018070* (3.4) 0.017440* (3.2) 0.010769* (2.6) 0.091943* (3.3) 0.088175* (3.2) 0.085844* (3.1) 
nw 0.118470 (2.0) 0.130215 (2.2) 0.133053 (2.3) 0.700702 (2.3) 0.728332 (2.4) 0.803780 (2.7) 
nw *age_pur -0.002305† (1.4) -0.002489† (1.5) -0.002246† (1.4) -0.016365** (1.9) -0.016647** (2.0) -0.017131** (2.0) 
age_pur^2 -0.000172** (2.4) -0.000161** (2.2) -6.78E-05† (1.3) -0.000922** (2.5) -0.000864** (2.4) -0.000842** (2.3) 
ln(hsz) 0.054657 (3.6) 0.053676 (3.4) 0.056691 (3.6) 0.310230 (3.9) 0.298148 (3.8) 0.311597 (4.0) 
inv_finan 0.079633 (6.3) 0.085569 (6.7) 0.087543 (6.9) 0.429236 (6.7) 0.445113 (7.0) 0.432470 (6.8) 
ln(p_m) -0.220145 (9.7) -0.218096 (9.4) -0.217326 (9.4) -1.379675 (11.6) -1.344768 (11.3) -1.363386 (11.6) 
year_91 0.053445 (1.9) 0.058892 (2.0) 0.061434 (2.1) 0.303684 (2.2) 0.327130 (2.3) 0.350966 (2.5) 
year_92 0.071603 (2.7) 0.080511 (3.0) 0.090123 (3.4) 0.484894 (3.5) 0.517795 (3.8) 0.610734 (4.5) 
year_93 -0.008987 (0.4) 1.59E-05 (0.0) 0.011903 (0.5) -0.092399 (0.7) -0.041705 (0.3) 0.053703 (0.4) 
year_94 -0.030133 (1.2) -0.026555 (1.0) -0.016074 (0.6) -0.182647 (1.4) -0.158929 (1.2) -0.065042 (0.5) 
year_95 -0.089535 (3.7) -0.082035 (3.3) -0.072895 (3.0) -0.457496 (3.7) -0.411453 (3.4) -0.335144 (2.8) 
year_96 -0.152718 (6.2) -0.148188 (5.9) -0.140121 (5.6) -0.764131 (6.0) -0.722609 (5.8) -0.656532 (5.3) 
year_97 -0.129201 (5.0) -0.122199 (4.6) -0.117948 (4.5) -0.592517 (4.5) -0.545391 (4.2) -0.469309 (3.6) 
year_98 -0.141880 (3.9) -0.148203 (4.0) -0.140058 (3.8) -0.641301 (3.5) -0.667695 (3.6) -0.572108 (3.1) 
                                                 
33 The median housing consumption of the sub-sample (purchase time after and 1990; age at the purchase time greater than 20 and less than 60) is S$355. The 
housing consumption that is equal or greater than S$1000 is treated as an outlier. 
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ex_cons 0.126543 (9.3) - - 0.600376 (8.5) - - 
DGP_ER 0.047424 (2.8) 0.048747 (2.8) - 0.433083 (5.0) 0.428783 (5.0) - 
DGP_NER 0.006560 (0.3) 0.002179 (0.1) - 0.152188 (1.6) 0.125249 (1.3) - 
DGP_NR 0.003008 (0.2) -0.003357 (0.2) - 0.435556 (4.3) 0.391883 (3.9) - 
DGP_WR 0.008834 (0.5) 0.006627 (0.4) - 0.261861 (3.0) 0.245214 (2.8) - 
R-squared 0.416  0.391 0.374 0.248  0.231  0.224 
Log likelihood 75.69  32.96 3.63 - - - 
LR(d.f.) - - - 1083(22)  1010(21)  979(17) 
       
∆t 6.7 7.7 16.6 8.9 9.6  10.2 
∗
newt  45.8 46.5 62.8 41 41.4  40.8 
∗
resalet  52.5 54.2 79.4 49.9  51  51 
*significant at 1% level **significance at 5% level       ***significance at 10% level 
† p value for the coefficient >10%  




7.3.2 Regression Results with Ordered-Choice Model 
 
Regression results from Ordered-choice model that are reported in the last three columns 
of table 7.1 also support our hypothesis. All the coefficients of age-related variables have 
expected signs and significant at less than 10% level. The values of 
∗∗∆ resalenew tandtt, from each regression in the last three rows of table 7.1 also indicate 
the shift of the housing consumption of new home buyers. Compared to the linear 
regression, ordered-choice model provides a little more significant results. 
 
 
7.4 Estimation of Housing Consumption under the Assumption of More Dynamic/     
      Less Dynamic Households 
 
We also investigate the impacts of the household permanent income as well as the 
education qualification of household head on households’ life-cycle housing choice. 
Linear regression is used for the measurement of housing consumption.   
 
7.4.1 Housing Consumption Estimation under High/Low Education Household Group 
 
A household with MIE attaining school for more than 10 years (post secondary) is sorted 
in the high education group. The observations for this group are about one third of the 
selected sample (675 observations relative to 2050 observations). We estimate the 
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housing consumption for such household group. The coefficients of age-related variables 
have expected signs. However, at least one of the three coefficients is insignificant in 
each regression equation, while the ∆t value from each regression is 6, 9 and 10 years 
respectively. For the low education group, the coefficients have expected signs and are 
insignificant. The ∆t value, 5, 5.5 and 6 years are a little lower, compared to those 
households under high education group.  
 
7.4.2 Housing Consumption Estimation under High/Low Income Household Group 
 
Table 7.2 presents regression results to catch the permanent income impacts on housing 
consumption choices under the assumption of high income household group 34 . 
Respectively, the regression results with DGP_l and ex_cons, or with DGP_l, or without 
DGP_l and ex_cons in the equations are reported in separate column of table 7.2. The 
coefficients of all age-related variables have expected signs and are significant at less 
than 10% level. This suggests that the significant difference in life-cycle housing 
consumption choice between new-flat buyers and resale buyers exists under high income 
household group, which is consistent with our second hypothesis35. 
 
The values of ∗∗∆ resalenew tandtt, from each regression are reported in table 7.3. All 
these values indicate the shift of housing consumption of new flat buyers. The volumes of 
the difference are still uncertain but are closer (from 11 years to 12 years) among the 
three scenarios under high income household group.  
                                                 
34 We simply divide the household group into two category income group. The cut point is the median 
income of the whole households. 
35 Please refer to Chapter 5.3. 
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For the low income household group, the coefficients of purage _ , ii puragenw _* and 
2_ ∧purage  are very insignificantly different from zero. The last three rows in table 7.3 
present the p-value for each coefficient of age-related variables. It suggests that there is 
no significant difference in life-cycle housing consumption choice between new and 




The empirical results in table 7.2 and 7.3 suggest that the high income household group 
be affected significantly by the regulations in the new flat market. With relatively high 
income, households consider the longer minimum occupied period would be a 
disadvantage when they are facing decision-making in housing consumption. As 
elaborated in Chapter 5, young professionals access to large new flats with the incentive 
to receive housing subsidies and expect large capital gains.   
 
For the low income household group, households buy large flats at older age because of 
the down payment constraint. After wealth accumulation through a long term working 
life or with more household members starting to work, such household group is able to 
pay the down payment of large flats. Meanwhile, they live in their homes usually for a 
long period without moving. The regulations in new-flat market, such as the rule of 
minimum occupied period or the income ceiling criteria have very limited effects on the 
low income household group.  
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Table 7.2: Estimates of Households’ Housing Consumption under the Assumption  
                  of High Income Group 
 
(We divide the selected sample into high income group and low income group at the 
cutting point of the median adjusted permanent income.  The observations in the high 
income group are 1024. t statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors & covariance.) 
 
Dep Variable Ln(HC) 
 Coefficient(t-Statistic) 
constant 3.015678 (12.4) 3.071780 (12.4) 3.064634 (12.5) 
ln(p_inc) 0.183763 (6.8) 0.177134 (6.4) 0.175183 (6.4) 
ln(c_inc) 0.085245 (5.0) 0.085097 (4.9) 0.085005 (4.9) 
age_pur 0.026663* (3.2) 0.025977* (3.0) 0.026895* (3.1) 
nw 0.266112 (2.8) 0.276433 (2.8) 0.290028 (3.0) 
nw *age_pur -0.006064** (2.2) -0.006235** (2.2) -0.006467** (2.3) 
age_pur^2 -0.000273** (2.5) -0.000261** (2.3) -0.000270** (2.4) 
ln(hsz) 0.096861 (4.1) 0.095307 (4.0) 0.096642 (4.1) 
inv_finan 0.104569 (5.4) 0.114027 (5.8) 0.116114 (5.9) 
ln(p_m) -0.217561 (6.6) -0.216566 (6.4) -0.217022 (6.5) 
year_91 -0.039129 (0.7) -0.024490 (0.4) -0.025580 (0.4) 
year_92 0.000969 (0.0) 0.014786 (0.3) 0.018750 (0.4) 
year_93 -0.050419 (1.1) -0.038154 (0.8) -0.033727 (0.7) 
year_94 -0.066426 (1.4) -0.055226 (1.2) -0.054759 (1.2) 
year_95 -0.150424 (3.3) -0.137946 (2.9) -0.136290 (2.9) 
year_96 -0.183312 (4.0) -0.170657 (3.6) -0.168931 (3.6) 
year_97 -0.152265 (3.2) -0.142596 (2.9) -0.141577 (2.9) 
year_98 -0.159771 (2.6) -0.177374 (2.9) -0.181451 (2.9) 
ex_cons 0.134569 (6.5) - - - - 
DGP_ER 0.029118 (1.2) 0.025652 (1.0) - - 
DGP_NER 0.021964 (0.8) 0.010137 (0.3) - - 
DGP_NR -0.002669 (0.1) -0.014397 (0.5) - - 
DGP_WR -0.011588 (0.5) -0.023806 (0.9) - - 










*significant at 1% level **significance at 5% level         










Table 7.3: The Differences of Life-cycle Housing Consumption Choices under the Assumption of High/Low Income Group 
 High Income Low Income♦ 
       
Regression with DGP_l & ex_cons with DGP_l without DGP_l & ex_cons with DGP_l & ex_cons with DGP_l without DGP_l & ex_cons 
       
∆t (years) 11 12 12 - - - 
∗
newt  38 38 38 - - - 
∗
resalet  49 50 50 - - - 
Age_pur 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.07 0.09 0.12 
nw*age_pur 0.028 0.027 0.021 0.71 0.77 0.70 
 
Age_pur^2 0.014 0.021 0.017 0.22 0.27 0.34 
♦As the coefficients of age_pur, nw*age_pur and age_pur^2 are very insignificant from our regression results 
under low income household group, the presence of such ∆t values are not meaningful. 
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7.5 Estimation of Housing Consumption under the Assumption of Consumption  
      Choice Reaching a Plateau 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5.4, households with high potential growth in income may have 
different housing consumption preferences. To examine the hypothesis made in Chapter 
5.4, we run the linear regression with OLS based on equation 11 in Chapter 6.3.  
Regression results are reported in table 7.4. 
 
The coefficients of ln(age_pur) and nw*(1/age_pur) have expected signs. The coefficient 
of nw*(1/age_pur) is positive, meaning that there is the difference in life-cycle housing 
consumption choice between new-flat buyers and resale buyers, while the statistical 
significance is a bit compromised. From equation 8 in chapter 5.4, we calculate the value 
of ∆t as 22.9 years for the high income household group, and 12.5 years for the high 
education group36.   
                                                 
36 As we discussed in chapter five, the time difference of housing consumption between new & resale flat 
buyers is more significant for the higher income/educated households. The value of ∆t in this section is also 
expected to be large. Compared to the results with the inverted U-shape life cycle hypothesis of housing 
consumption, the value of ∆t under high income household group have increased by about 100%. This may 
suggest that the log specification is inferior to the quadratic specification in our study of life-cycle housing 
choice. 
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Table 7.4: Estimates of Housing Consumption under the Assumption of  
      Consumption Choice Reaching a Plateau 
 
(t statistics in parentheses are based on White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors & covariance.) 
Dep. Variable ln(HC) 
Household Group  High Income High Education 
Observations  1024 675 
Indep. Variable37 Coefficient(t-Statistic) Coefficient(t-Statistic) 
Constant 2.785062 (11.2) 3.155781 (11.7) 
ln(p_inc) 0.189574 (7.1) 0.132233 (4.0) 
ln(c_inc) 0.083575 (4.9) 0.089019 (4.2) 
ln(age_pur) 0.218776 (5.0) 0.233380 (4.0) 
nw -0.087619 (0.8) -0.031950 (0.2) 
nw *(1/age_pur) 5.015534 (1.5) 2.925067 (0.7) 
ln(hsz) 0.098385 (4.2) 0.083929 (2.7) 
inv_finan 0.105815 (5.5) 0.131314 (5.4) 
ln(p_m) -0.210161 (6.4) -0.220226 (5.3) 
year_91 -0.032218 (0.5) 0.068817 (1.1) 
year_92 0.005387 (0.1) 0.047672 (0.9) 
year_93 -0.045752 (1.0) 0.005106 (0.1) 
year_94 -0.061554 (1.3) -0.028757 (0.6) 
year_95 -0.146078 (3.2) -0.113402 (2.3) 
year_96 -0.178382 (3.8) -0.163725 (3.2) 
year_97 -0.147845 (3.1) -0.126876 (2.3) 
year_98 -0.155313 (2.6) -0.173776 (2.4) 
ex_cons 0.134187 (6.5) -  
DGP_ER 0.029122 (1.2) -  
DGP_NER 0.018710 (0.6) -  
DGP_NR -0.003719 (0.1) -  
DGP_WR -0.013552 (0.5) -  
R-squared 0.356 0.335  
Log likelihood 5.67 -30.6 
 
                                                 
37 We also did several experiments with/without DGP_l and ex_cons in the equations. We present the best 
results we got from the regressions. 
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SUMMARY OF  




8.1 Main Findings 
 
Our empirical analysis shows an inverted U-shape life-cycle housing consumption pattern.  
We find that resale-flat buyers reach the housing consumption peak around 50 years old. 
It is about 10 years earlier for new-flat buyers. Based on linear regression that Net 
Assessed Value (NAV) is the measurement of housing consumption, we obtain the shifts 
ranging from 8 to 12 years. New-flat buyers reach the peak of housing consumption 
around 44 years old, while the resale buyers reach the peak of housing consumption in 
the range of age 53 to 56. Ordered-choice model, in which flat type is the measuring of 
housing consumption, provides similar results. The shift is from 11 to 15 years. New and 
resale buyers reach the peak of housing consumption, respectively, in the range of 37 to 
39 years old and 50 to 52 years old.  
 
As above, our empirical findings first lends support to our prediction that the minimum 
occupancy regulation and the income ceiling criteria in the new HDB market motivate 
home buyers to purchase large new units at earlier life. Then we show further evidence of 
the incentive by comparing the shift between high and low income household group. 
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Under high income household group, the shift in life-cycle housing choice between new 
and resale flat buyers is from 9 to 11 years.  For resale buyers, the age of a household 
head at the peak of housing consumption is around 50 years old. For new-flat buyers, it is 
about 10 years earlier. Our estimates are again consistent with the prediction. As 
expected, no significant difference in life-cycle housing choice is observed under low 
income household group as the coefficients of age-related variables are statistically 
insignificant (as shown in table 7.3).  
 
We also experimented with log(age_pur) specification to allow for the possibility of 
plateauing in the life-cycle housing choice for high income or high educated group. The 





Our study is firstly limited by the small sample size because we only focus on the 
households who purchased flats during 1990 to 1998. Second, with incomplete household 
data, for example, lack of new flat indicator, we identify new flats by using relevant 
market data. The way we identify "nw" seems sensible and the best we can do with the 
data we have, but we know that it is not a precise measure. 
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Third, Net Assessed Value (NAV) may not fully reflect the market valuation with respect 
to the consumption value of different flat types. We use ordered-choice model to check 
the possible bias and we find that the results of OLS appear largely unchanged.  
 
Although the data limitations prevent us from precisely identifying the shifts in life-cycle 
housing choice, the estimated sign of the shifts appears quite robust to different 
specifications of the model. 
 
 
8.4 Policy Implications 
 
Our empirical findings suggest that government regulations on housing market can distort 
the household’s life-cycle housing consumption choices. With the higher adjustment cost 
in the new flat market caused by the longer minimum occupied period, households 
usually make long-term housing choice decisions. The compromise of housing 
consumption causes a welfare loss for individual household. The distortional effects are 
more significant when households have higher permanent income. Such household group 
may consider the difference of the lock-in time between new & resale flat buyers as a 
disadvantage when they are making housing consumption decisions. However, this is not 
an important factor for the lower income household group when they are facing the 
similar situations.  
 
In addition, the income ceiling criteria for the entry of new-flat market has distortional 
effect on households’ life-cycle housing choice. Especially, the effect is more significant 
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for the high permanent income households. These households choose to buy large new 
flats sooner before they reach their income potential to avoid the income ceiling 
constraint. For example, young professional couples would have incentive to over-
consume housing at the time of home purchase in order to lock in the benefit of subsidy 
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Appendix 1: Singapore Housing System 
 
 
1 Other types of dwellings include the accommodation provided by employer, relative or friend.  
2 In the ownership sector, there are some other types of public and private houses not shown in the diagram 
chain. The percentage of those houses is very small. 
3 Executive condominium is separated from other HDB flats because EC is a link to private housing. The 
market for ECs is also different from that for other HDB flats. 
Singapore Housing System
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Ownership sector2 Ownership sector2 Rental & others1 
 








































Appendix 2: Eligibility Conditions for the Purchase of HDB Homes38 
 
Buying a Flat Direct 
from HDB 
Buying a Resale Flat on 
the Open Market 




At least 21 years of age 
Have a nucleus family 
 
 
Total household income 
not more than S$4,000 
per month. (The income 
ceiling was raised to 
S$7,000 in 1992 and 
S$8,000 in 1994)  
Must not own any 
private residential 
property (From October 
1991, new HDB flat 
owners can invest in 
private property but 
must continue to reside 
in their flats.) 
 
Minimum occupancy 
period before HDB 
lessees can reapply for a 
new flat from HDB is 
18 months. (Time bar 
raised to 5 years in 
1992, and from 5 years 
to 10 years in 1997.) 
Singapore citizen or 
Permanent Resident 
At least 21 years of age 
Have a nucleus family 
(Singles above 35 can 
purchase 3-room or 
smaller flats outside the 
Central Area from 
October 1991. Singles 
can buy any types of 
HDB flats from 2004.) 












period is 2.5 years if no 
cash grant was given. 
Singapore citizen 
At least 21 years of age 
Have a nucleus family; 
(2 or more related 
orphans, two single 
Singapore citizens and 
at least 35 years of age 
can purchase ECs)  
 
Total household income 
not more than S$10,000 
per month. 
 
Ownership of private 







period is 5 years. Only 
Singapore citizens and 
Singapore permanent 
residents can buy the 
resale ECs from the 6th 
to 10th year. No 
restrictions on resale 
ECs’ buyers from the 
11th year. 
 
                                                 
38 Refer to Lum and Fu (2004), the third column about the eligibility conditions to Executive 
Condominiums is added.  
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 Appendix 3: Permanent Income Estimation 
 
Table A3.1: Variable definition and sample statistics (include the total sample---5555 
observations) 
Variables Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
inc_wk Household income from work 4639 4547 
age Age of main income earner (MIE) 40.48 10.74 
sch_pri MIE of household attended primary school 0.251 0.433 
sch_sec MIE of household attended secondary school 0.288 0.453 
sch_upp MIE of household attended upper secondary school 0.083 0.276 
sch_poly MIE of household attended polytechnic 0.105 0.307 
sch_ter MIE of household attended university 0.135 0.342 
sch_default 
Default highest education group: the highest 
education attained of MIE is below primary 
school. 
  
post_sec Dummy variable: 1 if the highest qualification of MIE is post secondary 0.323 0.468 
post_upp_sec Dummy variable: 1 if the highest qualification of MIE is post upper secondary 0.240 0.427 
occup_sales Dummy variable: 1 if occupation of MIE is service or sales workers 0.109 0.312 
occup_clerk Dummy variable: 1 if occupation of MIE is clerical workers 0.110 0.313 
occup_tech Dummy variable: 1 if occupation of MIE is technical workers 0.186 0.389 
occup_admin_prof 
Dummy variable: 1 if occupation of MIE is 
legislators, administrators, managers or 
professionals 
0.272 0.445 
occup_default Default occupational group: agricultural, production-related workers, not classifiable   
hsz Household size 4.01 1.40 
married Dummy variable: 1 if MIE is married 0.744 0.437 
car_own Dummy variable: 1 if the household owns at least one car 0.376 0.484 
num_hp Number of hand phones possessed 0.694 0.774 
internet Dummy variable: 1 if the household has internet access 0.241 0.428 
num_pc Number of personal computers possessed 0.581 0.647 
num_motor_vehicle Number of motor vehicles possessed, including cars, scooters and vans 0.603 0.668 
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Table A3.2: Estimates of Household Income from Work with OLS 
 
(The dependent variable is ln(inc_wk). Sample size is 5555. t statistics are based on White 
Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance.) 
 
    
Variable Coefficient (t-Statistic) 
c 6.440049 (48.8) 
age 0.016138 (2.5) 
age*age -0.000172 (2.2) 
sch_pri 0.124695 (4.7) 
sch_sec 0.354946 (12.0) 
sch_upp 0.498812 (8.6) 
sch_poly 0.511419 (11.8) 
sch_ter 0.735264 (16.2) 
post_sec*(age>=30) 0.069587 (1.1) 
post_sec*(age>=40) -0.192810 (3.2) 
post_sec*(age>=50) 0.187536 (3.7) 
post_sec*(age>=60) -0.289028 (1.6) 
post_upp_sec*(age>=30) 0.101158 (1.5) 
post_upp_sec*(age>=40) 0.168105 (2.5) 
occup_sales 0.090135 (3.5) 
occup_clerk 0.228790 (9.0) 
occup_tech 0.279145 (11.6) 
occup_admin_prof 0.410072 (16.3) 
ln(hsz) 0.333372 (15.6) 
married 0.077633 (4.1) 
car_own 0.131878 (6.4) 
num_hp 0.152681 (15.0) 
internet 0.088032 (4.5) 
num_pc 0.085009 (6.0) 
Num_motor_vehicle 0.119267 (7.9) 








Appendix 4: Estimation of Excess Consumption --- Linear Regression 
 
(Dependent Variable: ln(hh_cons). Sample includes the households who are home buyers 
of HDB 3-room flats and above after the year 1990. The households with MIEs aged 
below 21 or over 60 at the time of home purchase are excluded. The total sample size is 
2054 observations. t statistics in parentheses are based on White Heteroskedasticity-




Variable Coefficient (t-Statistic) 
Constant 3.222 (23.6) 
ln(p_income) 0.292 (12.0) 
Ln(c_income) 0.239 (11.0) 
(age>=30 and age<40) -0.0564 (1.9) 
(age>=40 and age<50) 0.0176 (0.6) 
(age>=50 and age<60) 0.117 (2.7) 
age>=60 0.394 (2.5) 
ln(hsz) 0.281 (10.9) 
married  -0.0642 (2.3) 
R-squared 0.409
 
 
